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Semantic  representation  of  synaesthesia
Abstract.   Synaesthesia   has   multifaceted   consequences   for   both   subjective  
experience  and  cognitive  performance.  Here,  I  broach  the  issue  of  how  synaesthesia  
is   represented   in   semantic  memory.   I  hypothesize   that,   for  example,   in  grapheme  
colour  synaesthesia,  colour  is  represented  as  an  additional  feature  in  the  semantic  
network   that   enables   the   formation   of   associations   that   are   not   present   in   non-­
synaesthetes.   Thus,   synaesthesia   provokes   richer   memory   representations   which  
enable   learning   opportunities   that   are   not   present   in   non-­synaesthetes,   provides  
additional  memory  cues,  and  may  trigger  creative  ideas.
Keywords:   synaesthesia;;   semantic   representation   system;;   semantic   memory;;  
unidirectionality;;  bidirectionality;;  startle  response;;  cognitive  style.
In  synaesthesia  ordinary  stimuli  trigger  untypical  experiences.  For  example,  
the  letter  A  printed  in  black  may  also  trigger  a  particular  colour  experience  
(e.g.,  red).  The  experience  is  consistent,  triggered  automatically,  and  typically  
has  always  been  there,  since  a  synaesthete  can  remember  (cf.  Baron-­Cohen  
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of  the  general  population  are  affected  by  this  condition  (Simner  et  al.  2006).  
Most   typical  are   inducers  such  as  digits,   letters,  words,  days  of   the  week,  
months,  or  sound  and  the  concurrent  experience  is  most  typically  related  to  
colour   or   space   (Novich   et   al.   2011).  However,  many  more   combinations  
are  possible  (see  the  list  of  synaesthesias  by  Sean  Day;;  2013).  It  has  been  
established  as  a  convention  that  the  particular  form  is  termed  according  to  its  
inducer-­concurrent  pairs  (e.g.,  grapheme-­colour).  As  most  research  has  been  
conducted  on  grapheme-­colour  synaesthesia,  here  I  focus  on  this  particular  
form,  although  some  of  the  remarks  are  more  general,  and  although  it  must  
be  noted  that  many  synaesthetes  have  more  than  one  form  of  synaesthesia.
Recent   research   has   made   progress   in   showing   that   the   condition  
is   real;;   that   is,   it   has   a   neurological   basis.   There   is   converging   evidence  
from   functional   imaging   studies,   diffusion   tensor   imaging,   and   voxel-­
based  morphometry   that   temporal   regions   related   to   processing   form   and  
colour  and  parietal  areas  related  to  binding  processes  are  critically  involved  
in   (grapheme-­colour)   synaesthesia   (Hubbard  et   al.  2005;;  Hubbard,  Brang,  
and  Ramachandran  2011;;  Rouw  and  Scholte   2007,   2010;;  Weiss   and  Fink  
 0RUHRYHU ¿QGLQJV EDVHG RQ HYHQWUHODWHG SRWHQWLDOV VXJJHVW WKDW
synaesthetes  may  differ   in  magno-­   and   parvo-­cellular   processing   (Barnett  
et   al.   2008).   In   addition,   a   recent   study   has   suggested   that   synaesthesia  
is  accompanied  by  globally  altered  brain  network   topology   (Hänggi  et   al.  
2011).
Moreover,   synaesthesia   can   have   consequences   for   cognitive  
performance,  in  particular  for  memory  (e.g.,  Yaro  and  Ward  2007;;  Rothen  
and   Meier   2010a;;   Radvansky,   Gibson   and   McNerney   2011;;   see   Rothen,  
Meier,  and  Ward  2012;;  Meier  and  Rothen  2013,  for  recent  reviews).  Thus,  
synaesthesia  may   provide   additional   retrieval   cues   which   can   be   used   to  
retrieve  information  from  memory.  However,  as  there  is  also  some  evidence  
that  synaesthetes  have  a  memory  advantage  even  for  materials  that  do  not  
trigger   synaesthesia   (e.g.,  Rothen   and  Meier  2010a),   this   seems  not   to  be  
the  whole  explanation.  It  is  possible  that  synaesthetes  may  have  a  generally  
enriched  world  of  experience  and  that  this  is  directly  related  to  the  available  
semantic  representations.  I  will  elaborate  on  this  point  below.
Originally,   it   has  been   thought   that   synaesthesia   can  be   characterized  
as   a   perceptual   phenomenon   (Baron-­Cohen   and  Harrison   1997;;   Laeng   et  
al.   2004;;  Mattingley   et   al.   2001;;   Palmeri   et   al.   2002;;  Ramachandran   and  
Hubbard  2001a).  For   example,  Ramachandran   and  Hubbard   (2001a)  used  
a   visual   search   task   to   investigate   whether   synaesthetic   experiences   are  
genuinely  perceptual.  They  presented  different  geometric  shapes  consisting  
of  the  digits  that  triggered  particular  colour  experiences  for  two  synaesthetes.  
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The  result  showed  that  the  synaesthetes  recognized  more  shapes  than  a  control  
JURXS 0RUHRYHU LQ DQRWKHU H[SHULPHQW SUHVHQWLQJ D ÀDQNHG JUDSKHPH
LQWKHSHULSKHU\RIWKHYLVXDO¿HOGHYRNHGFRORXUHYHQWKRXJKWKHJUDSKHPH
LWVHOIFRXOGQRWEHLGHQWL¿HG7KHVHUHVXOWVVXJJHVWWKDWV\QDHVWKHVLDRFFXUV
at  an  early  stage  of  perceptual  processing.  However,  follow-­up  studies  using  
many  different  variants  of  the  visual  search  task,  did  not  replicate  this  result  
(Edquistet  al.  2006;;  Rothen  and  Meier  2009;;  Sagiv  et  al.  2006;;  Ward  et  al.  
2010).  These  discrepant  results  can  be  explained  by  individual  differences  
between  synaesthetes  (e.g.,  lower  vs.  higher).  However,  in  addition,  the  latter  
results  at  least  seem  to  suggest  that  synaesthesia  is  not  purely  a  perceptual  
condition.
In  line  with  these  considerations,  research  using  ambiguous  graphemes,  
for  example  where  a  2  can  be  perceived  as  a  Z  or  a  5  as  an  S,  showed  that,  
depending   on   the   context,   the   same   physical   stimulus   can   be   perceived  
LQDGLIIHUHQWFRORXUGHSHQGLQJRQWKHFRQWH[WVSHFL¿FLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ0\OHV
et   al.   2003;;   Dixon   et   al.   2006).   Moreover,   when   an   arithmetic   problem  
is  presented  (e.g.,  5  +  2)  and  immediately  afterwards  the  colour  of  a  colour  
patch  must  be  named,  naming  times  are  faster  when  the  synaesthetic  colour  
of  the  solution  to  the  calculation  is  congruent  to  the  colour  patch  (Dixon  et  al.  
2000).  This  result  suggests  that  activating  the  conceptual  representation  of  an  
LQGXFHULVVXI¿FLHQWWRWULJJHUDV\QDHVWKHWLFUHVSRQVH,QIDFWV\QDHVWKHWLF
experiences   can  even  occur   for   imagined   synaesthetic   inducers   (Frith   and  
Paulesu  1997;;  Ramachandran  and  Hubbard  2001b).
Further   support   for   the   presence   of   a   strong   conceptual   contribution  
to  synaesthesia  comes  from  research  on  implicit  bidirectionality.  Although  
at   the   level  of  subjective  experience  the  activation  of   the  concurrent  (e.g.,  
colour)   is   typically   unidirectional   –   from   the   inducer   to   the   concurrent,  
performance   on   an   inducer   stimulus   may   also   be   biased   by   an   implicit  
activation   of   a   concurrent.   For   example,   reversing   the   usual   synaesthetic  
Stroop   test,   Johnson  et  al.   (2007)   found   that   responding   to   incongruently-­
coloured   stimuli   was   slowed   compared   to   congruently   coloured   stimuli.  
Brugger  et  al.  (2004)  found  faster  left-­hand  responses  for  colours  associated  
with  small  numbers  and  faster  right-­hand  responses  for  colours  associated  
with  large  numbers  in  digit-­colour  synaesthetes.  Cohen  Kadosh  and  Henik  
(2006)   asked   digit-­colour   synaesthetes   to   decide  which   one   of   two   digits  
was  numerically  larger.  They  found  a  facilitation  of  performance  whenever  
the   synaesthetic   colours   elicited   by   the   digits   indicated   a   larger   distance  
WKDQ WKH UHOHYDQW QXPHULFDO YDOXHV .QRFK HW DO  XVHG D PRGL¿HG
random   generation   task   in   which   they   asked   digit-­colour   synaesthetes  
to   generate   random   sequences   of   colours.   Their   results   showed   a   similar  
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pattern  of  counting  bias  as  it  is  known  from  traditional  number  generation  
tasks.  Weiss   et   al.   (2009)   presented   participants   with   a   word-­completion  
task   in  which   letter   strings  could  be   turned   into  a  high-­  or   low-­frequency  
ZRUGE\DGGLQJDGLIIHUHQW¿UVWOHWWHU:KHQWKHVSDFHIRUWKH¿UVWOHWWHUZDV
primed  by  the  colour  of  the  letter  that  would  form  the  low-­frequency  word,  
performance  of  the  synaesthetes  was  in  fact  biased  towards  completing  the  
low-­frequency  word.
Moreover,   with   a   psycho-­physiological  method,   we   have   shown   that  
a   startle   response   that   is  conditioned   to  a  particular  colour   is  also  elicited  
when   a   grapheme   is   presented   that   induces   that   particular   colour   (Meier  
and  Rothen  2007).  As  the  synaesthetic  inducer  never  co-­occurred  with  the  
startling  sound,  we  have  argued  that  an  indirect  activation  of  the  grapheme  
representation  (i.e.,  through  implicit  bidirectionality)  was  responsible  for  the  
establishment  of   an  association  with   the   startle   response.  This   association  
ZDVUHDFWLYDWHGDQG¿UHGEDFNZKHQWKHJUDSKHPHZDVSUHVHQWHGSK\VLFDOO\
which  resulted  in  another  conditioned  startle  response.  In  a  follow-­up  study,  
we   have   demonstrated   that,   by   suppressing   parieto-­occipital   regions  with  
transcranial  magnetic  stimulation,  bidirectionality  was  interrupted  (Rothen  
HW DO  6SHFL¿FDOO\ D FRQGLWLRQHG UHVSRQVH ZDV HYLGHQW IRU FRORXU
patches,  but  no  conditioned  response  occurred  for  graphemes.  These  results  
indicate   that   the   same   brain   areas   that   have   been   shown   to   be   involved  
in   unidirectional   synaesthetic   colour   experiences   (Estermann,   Verstynen,  
Ivry,  and  Robertson  2006;;  Muggleton,  Tsakanikos,  Walsh,  and  Ward  2007)  
are  also  involved  in  implicit  bidirectionality.
:KDWEHFRPHVFOHDUIURPWKHVHHPSLULFDO¿QGLQJVLVWKDWLQPDQ\FDVHV
synaesthesia  is  triggered  conceptually  rather  than  by  the  physical  presence  
of   the   inducer.   Thus,   synaesthesia   depends   on   the   interpretation   of   the  
inducers   and   their  meaning   rather   than   the  mere   appearance   of   particular  
stimuli.   Rather   than   being   caused   by   low-­level   pre-­wired   connections  
between   sensory   representations,   higher-­order   representations   in   the  
brain   seem   to   be   responsible   for   the   particular   synaesthetic   experiences.  
As   a   consequence,   a   representation  of   the   inducer-­concurrent   relationship  
must  be  stored  in  the  brain  and  this  representation  is  activated  in  the  absence  
of  physical  stimulation.  
From   these   considerations,   it   seems   obvious   that   synaesthesia  
is  represented  in  the  semantic  knowledge  system.  However,  the  question  how  
synaesthetic  concurrents  are  represented  in  the  semantic  knowledge  structure  
has   not   received   much   attention   yet.   Here,   I   propose   that   synaesthetic  
concurrents  are  represented  as  additional  features  in  the  semantic  network,  
and,   via   spreading   activation,   these   features   allow   for   supplementary  
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connections  (cf.  Collins  and  Loftus  1975;;  Cree  and  McCrae  2003).  That  is,  
associations  may  be   easily   formed   in   synaesthetes  which   are   not   obvious  
for   non-­synaesthetes   and   these   associations  may   be   expressed   as   creative  
thoughts,   enriched  memory   representations,   and   in   general   a   richer  world  
of  experience.
For   example,   consider   the   case   of   a   synaesthete   who   has   colour  
experiences   for   letters   and,   in   addition,   words   are   also   coloured   either  
DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH GRPLQDQW YRZHO RU WKH¿UVW OHWWHU 6SHFL¿FDOO\ WKH OHWWHU
A  may  trigger  the  colour  red,  and  similarly  words  such  as  tailor,  mail,  or  acid  
may  also  trigger  the  colour  red.  Suppose  that  the  colour  red  is  represented  
in  the  semantic  network  with  connections  to  other  objects  such  as  tomato,  
¿UH HQJLQH DQG DQJHU )RU WKLV SDUWLFXODU SHUVRQ DVVRFLDWLRQV EHWZHHQ
WDLORUDQGWRPDWRPDLODQG¿UHHQJLQHHWFPD\EHPRUHHDVLO\HVWDEOLVKHG
than  for  a  person  without  synaesthesia.  Thus,  via  spreading  activation,  this  
person  may  generate  easily  curious  thoughts  and  ideas  that  make  the  world  
of  experiences  richer  compared  to  non-­synaesthetes.  In  Figure  1,  this  example  
of  an  activated  semantic  network  in  response  to  the  letter  A  for  a  synaesthete  
(left)  and  a  non-­synaesthete  (right)  is  illustrated.  
  
  
  Figure  1.    Illustration  of  exemplary  activations  in  the  semantic  network  in  response  
to  the  letter  A  in  a  synaesthete  with  a  corresponding  red  colour  experience  
(left)  and  a  non-­synaesthetic  control  (right).
Having   an   enriched   semantic   network   provides   for   richer   encoding  
and   for   additional   retrieval   cues   which   may   be   the   basis   for   a   memory  
advantage.  Moreover,  the  presence  of  additional  connections  between  nodes  
in   the  semantic  network  may  also  be   the  basis  for   the   increased  creativity  
in  synaesthesia.  There  is  suggestive  evidence  for  a  link  between  synaesthesia  
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and  occupation  with  creative  arts  (cf.  Rothen  and  Meier  2010b;;  Ward  et  al.  
2008).
,QVSLUHGE\WKH¿QGLQJVRQWKHFRJQLWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIV\QDHVWKHVLD  
IRUPHPRU\ FUHDWLYLW\ DQG LPDJHU\ DQG E\ ¿QGLQJV IURP QHXURLPDJLQJ
studies,   we   have   recently   investigated   whether   synaesthesia   would   be  
associated   with   a   distinct   cognitive   style   (Meier   and   Rothen   2013).  
6SHFL¿FDOO\ ZH KDYH K\SRWKHVL]HG WKDW LQ JUDSKHPHFRORXU V\QDHVWKHVLD
a  preference  for  both  verbal  and  visual  cognitive  styles  may  be  prevalent.  
7KH UHVXOWVRI WZRH[SHULPHQWVFRQ¿UPHG WKLVDVVXPSWLRQ0RUHRYHURXU
results   suggested   that   a   preference   for   a  more   vivid   imagery   style   is   also  
prevalent   for   other   forms   of   synaesthesia,   in   particular   those   that   involve  
colour   (i.e.,   grapheme-­colour   and   sound-­colour),   and   in   the   case   of   the  
absence   of   grapheme-­colour   synaesthesia,   those   that   involved   multiple  
other   forms  of   synaesthesia   such  as   lexical-­gustatory  and  sequence-­space.  
Thus,  in  the  absence  of  colour  synaesthesia,  the  presence  of  multiple  forms  
of  synaesthesia  also  seemed  to  induce  a  richer  world  of  experience  that  was  
WKHQVXI¿FLHQWWRHQKDQFHWKHSUHIHUHQFHIRUDYLYLGLPDJHU\FRJQLWLYHVW\OH
As  noted,  for  grapheme-­colour  synaesthesia,  both  a  verbal  and  a  vivid  
imagery   style   co-­occurred.   Graphemes   are   instances   of   sequences   and  
thus,   they   involve  serial,  analytic  processing,  favouring  a  verbal  cognitive  
style.   In   contrast,   colours   are   visual   instances,   which   involve   parallel   or  
holistic  processing,  thus  favouring  a  visual  cognitive  style.  The  combination  
of  a  verbal  and  a  vivid  imagery  visual  style  in  grapheme-­colour  synaesthetes  
and  their  propensity  to  switch  easily  between  these  styles  may,  in  fact,  be  at  
WKHFRUHRIWKHFRJQLWLYHEHQH¿WVUHODWHGWRJUDSKHPHFRORXUV\QDHVWKHVLD
To  conclude,  I  would   like   to  draw  attention  again   to   the   issue  of  uni-­  
vs.   bi-­directionality.   One   may   wonder   why   synaesthesia   should   be  
a  unidirectional  phenomenon  at  all.  If  letters  induce  colour  experiences,  then  
why   do   colours   not   also   induce   letter   experiences?  The   properties   of   the  
semantic   representation   system,   in   particular   the   fan-­effect,   may   provide  
a  clue  to  answer  this  question  (cf.  Rothen  et  al.  2010).  The  term  ‘fan’  refers  
to  the  number  of  facts  associated  with  a  particular  concept.  Anderson  (1974)  
showed  that  recognition  latencies  increased  as  the  concepts  were  associated  
with  more   features.   In   the   domain   of   synaesthesia,   inducers   are   typically  
cultural  artefacts,  that  is,  stimuli  such  as  numerals,  letters  and  words  which  
are  comprehended  only  after  extensive  experience.  In  contrast,  concurrents  
represent  more  natural  categories  which  are  “just  there”  in  the  outside  world  
and   which   can   be   comprehended   without   cultural   education.   If   cultural  
artefacts   (i.e.,   inducers)   are  more   symbolic   and   less   concrete   than  natural  
categories   (i.e.,   concurrents),   then   an   inducer  would   activate   fewer   nodes  
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compared  to  a  concurrent  (cf.  Collins  and  Loftus  1975).  By  this  explanation,  
the   association   between   inducer   and   concurrent   is   stronger   and   therefore  
the   threshold   for   a   conscious   experience   may   be   crossed   more   quickly.  
Reciprocally,   the   association   between   concurrent   and   inducer   is   weaker  
and  therefore  the  threshold  for  a  conscious  experience  may  not  be  crossed.  
However,   using   appropriate   measures,   its   existence   can   be   demonstrated  
nevertheless  as  shown  in  studies  on  implicit  bidirectionality.  
I   propose   that   future   research   should   focus   more   on   the   semantic  
representation  of  synaesthesia.  As  suggested  recently,  in  general,  synaesthesia  
may  be  typically  a  semantic  phenomenon  and  thus,  low-­level  synaesthesia  
may   rather   be   the   exception   than   the   rule   (e.g.,   Mroczko-­Wasowicz   and  
Werning   2012;;  Nikolic   et   al.   2011;;  Rothen   et   al.   2013).  However,   higher  
level   representation   may   be   a   prerequisite   for   cognitive   consequences  
of  synaesthesia  in  domains  such  as  memory  and  creativity,  and  may  determine  
the  preferred  cognitive  processing  style.
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